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Introduction
The debate over whether, and in what circumstances, foreign aid displaces domestic tax revenue has a long history. The debate is clearly important: the immediate effect would be to reduce the effective value of aid flows, as they would not be additional resources for the recipient government but rather crowd out tax revenue. A recent quote from the House of Commons International Development Committee (2013: 4) illustrates the point well: '[w]e cannot expect the people in the UK to pay taxes to improve education and health in Pakistan if the Pakistan elite is not paying income tax'. An even greater fear relates to a potential pernicious effect of aid over a longer time horizon, where it could conceivably undermine governance through fracturing the social contract. Deaton (2013: 295) argues that '[o] ne of the strongest arguments against large aid flows is that they undermine these constraints, removing the need to raise money with consent and in the limit turning what should be beneficial political institutions into toxic ones'.
This article focuses specifically on the link between aid and tax revenue, where it is argued that aid has different effects depending on whether it is given as grants or loans. Schmidt (1964) contains the majority of the theoretical reasons regarding whether there should be a differential effect from aid grants and loans, and since then the question has predominately been recognised as empirical. Gupta et al. (2004) entered the debate with a strong claim: aid grants depress domestic tax revenue but aid loans do not. The empirical basis for this claim was disputed by Clist and Morrissey (2011) and Carter (2010 Carter ( , 2013 . The former extended the dataset and found that the negative relationship is not present if: a) the period 1985-2005 is examined, or b) aid is included in specifications with a more reasonable lag. The latter found the results to be fragile to sample, and suggested that endogeneity may be driving the negative relationship between aid grants and tax revenue. Endogeneity is a concern, as the composition and volume of aid is not exogenous to factors such as per capita income or aid. Benedek et al. (2012) can be seen as a follow-up to Gupta et al. (2004) , and responds to criticism with new methods and data but ultimately presents very similar findings. 1 Here, I examine the evidence base for these claims, which influence important decisions about the correct composition of aid, and feed into the wider debate regarding the effect of aid on governance.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 1 attempts, and fails, to replicate Benedek et al.'s (2012) results using the provided and described data. An advanced discussion of the suitability of Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) techniques is found elsewhere (Carter 2010 (Carter , 2013 but the data is found to have more basic weaknesses. These weaknesses, stemming mainly from the use of multiple different sources, are explored in Section 2. A variety of solutions are examined in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.
1 Replication attempt
Replicating Benedek et al. (2012)
I have attempted to replicate Benedek et al.'s (2012) results using the provided dependent variable and listed sources. There are several discrepancies. Limiting the sample to the countries in Appendix 1 of Benedek et al. (2012) , there are six countries which are apparently included in the regression results but for whom no data exists for the dependent Both are written by IMF-based researchers, and they share one author. 7 variable (four countries are not in the dataset, two exist but have no data). Clearly, both the provided dataset and the article cannot both be fully accurate, stymieing attempts to replicate the results. Comparisons between summary statistics in Benedek et al. (2012) and those from the reported sources reveal several other discrepancies. For example, the paper reports a mean value of 18.75 for trade openness, (exports+imports)/GDP, but a newly constructed dataset using the reported data sources gives a mean of 54. While an accurate replication has proved impossible, the regression results from the attempted replication are found in columns (1) and (3) of Table 1 . For ease of reference, Benedek et al. (2012) results are reproduced in columns (5) and (6). These new results concur that tax revenue has a negative association with agriculture, and a positive association with income per capita. However, the coefficients reported in (1) and (3) differ in their sign on several key variables: Aid, Aid Squared, Industry and Trade Openness. The least important of these differences relates to industry: the coefficient is insignificant in all specifications. The coefficient for trade openness is positive in Table 1 , but was found to be negative by Benedek et al. (2012) . Despite apparently using the same sources, there seems to be quite a large difference in the two variables, as shown by comparing summary statistics. Logically, we would expect higher trade openness to mean higher tax revenue as a percentage of GDP as import taxes are relatively easy to collect, and so the results here are more intuitively plausible. In later analysis I follow Clist and Morrissey (2011) , who disaggregate 'trade' into imports and exports as they logically have different effects.
A negative effect from aid?
Turning to the coefficients of interest, there is a large disparity between the coefficients found using the new dataset and those reported by Benedek et al. (2012) . They find that aid has a negative effect on tax revenue but has increasing returns. They find a similar pattern for aid grants, but a positive effect for loans with decreasing returns. By contrast, I find the pattern of a positive effect with diminishing returns for all types of aid: total, grants and loans. Benedek et al. (2012) conclude that aid (especially in the form of grants) has a negative association with tax revenue. They acknowledge but do not emphasise that their results imply that a higher level of grants actually has a positive effect on domestic tax revenue collection.
The results here are more in line with expectation (at least regarding non-linearity): aid's positive effect on tax revenue diminishes as it becomes increasingly large relative to GDP. Table 2 reports the implied turning points, taken from Table 1 . The turning point for total aid is calculated to be 65 per cent of GDP, meaning that aid can be said to have a negative effect on 0.3 per cent of the sample and a positive effect for the other 99.7 per cent. Grants are found to be more negative than loans when using this metric, but can still only be said to have a negative effect on domestic tax revenue in 1.8 per cent of the sample. The results from these regressions do not support the conclusion that aid, in whatever form, is negatively associated with domestic tax revenue. It is not clear how the sample or data used here varies from Benedek et al. (2012) , as I use their reported sources for independent variables and their provided dataset for the dependent variable, but the difference is meaningful. Perhaps the most important point to notice from the reported results is that the estimated coefficients for total aid and aid grants are not significant. Of the six relevant coefficients in columns (5) and (6) only two are significant, and only then at the 10 per cent level. Indeed, it appears that aid is a relatively small factor in tax revenue. This is consistent 9 with other results such as Gupta (2007); he focuses on determinants of tax revenue and finds aid has a small but significant positive effect.
Multiple sources
Clist and Morrissey (2011) reported a system break when extending the dataset of Gupta et al. (2004 Gupta et al. ( ) from 1970 Gupta et al. ( -2000 Gupta et al. ( to 1970 Gupta et al. ( -2005 . This time effect implied that while Gupta et al. (2004) were right to report a negative relationship, this effect was only relevant in the period 1970-1985, with a positive relationship being a better characterisation of the period 1986-2005. Using the reported data sources I cannot replicate the weak negative association found by Benedek et al. (2012) , nor the system break of Clist and Morrissey (2011) , with the new data and time period. Regressions that augment the independent variables with an interaction term (where aid variables are multiplied by a dummy for post-1984) lack extra explanatory power as the augmented variables are insignificant, as shown in Table A1 in Appendix 1. A key element of the time trend may actually have been that using two different data sources as pre-1990 data (termed 'historical') was not comparable with post-1990 data, 2 but was treated as such. While there appears to be no systematic time trend effect in the data, there are several different sources used.
While Benedek et al. (2012) treat the dependent variable as a single variable, they acknowledge that there are actually several sources. Each of these has their own data definition and methodology, and so the data is not strictly comparable. The largest difference between sources is perhaps that they explicitly measure different things: IMF GFS data measures tax revenue, while the World Economic Outlook data (the largest single source, Table 3 ) relates to all government revenue. 3 The definition of the WEO variable implies that it includes aid, making it especially problematic. In addition, three different types of data are used: general, central and budgetary definitions are treated as the same. The difference in source is compounded by differences in coverage between datasets. The OECD data covers higher-income countries, and so the two samples overlap for only three countries: Chile, Mexico and Turkey. In the majority of cases, sources are inconsistent by recipient: on average countries are represented by about 1.8 sources over the 30-year period.
Does the difference in sources matter? Columns (2) and (4) of Table 1 report the regression results from the two models proposed by Benedek et al. (2012) augmented by source dummies. There is clearly some effect of the source: the GFS 2001 central government figures appear to be relatively high, and GFS 2001 budgetary figures are relatively low. These are significant effects, with the latter coefficient much larger than the coefficient on aid loans, for example. However, this table does not represent a particularly elaborate test. If different sources were consistent in their differences, then the problem is easily rectified using source dummies, and the coefficients would be stable. observations or countries, but the results are quite different across the sources. Benedek et al. (2012) report that aid has a negative effect with increasing returns to scale. This pattern is only found when using GFS 2001 data; indeed the two largest datasets find opposite coefficient signs. Most variables are found to be significant in at least one regression or other, but this is not a sign of consistency. Trade Openness stands out as the only variable not to be found significant with both positive and negative signs. To summarise, Table 3 shows that coefficient estimates are not robust to the various sources used, and questions the robustness of results in Benedek et al. (2012) . More elaborate techniques, such as GMM, would seem to compound the problem rather than solve it. For example, in the 2,458 cases where the same source is available for two consecutive years for a country, there is an average difference of 1.3 per cent in tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. In the ninety-six cases where different sources are used for consecutive years, the mean difference is 4.9 per cent. Difference GMM estimations would see large random fluctuations that result from using different sources. These are not controlled for, and represent outliers that may erroneously drive the results. While Carter (2013) deals with many of the more technical aspects of empirical research in this area (concluding that there is little evidence of a negative effect from aid on tax), it appears there are much more fundamental problems with the data that are only compounded by the use of methods such as GMM.
dependent variables described by Benedek et al. (2012) for 1980-2011 for their chosen sample, from the original sources. Benedek et al. (2012) treat the different variables as essentially interchangeable, and replace any missing observations from one dataset with those of any other. The benefit of this approach is that it minimises selection issues by maximising the sample size. However, it is potentially very problematic and at the very least introduces abnormally high measurement error. The preceding section showed that sample-specific dummies are significant when added to the main specification used in Benedek et al. (2012) , and that running seven separate regressions leads to very different coefficient estimates for the variables of interest. A further complication that is noted here, but not explored further, is that the order in which missing data was replaced may have large effects. This may seem trivial, but with seven sources there are 5,040 possible orderings 4 , which is problematic unless the different sources are completely compatible.
Option 1 Treat variables as interchangeable
As a further test of whether the various sources are measuring the same thing, I use the newly-constructed dataset to investigate cases where more than one source exists for any given observation. If the variables are to be treated as interchangeable they must be more than correlated: two variables could be perfectly correlated if one is always double the other, but they would not be interchangeable. The requirement for treating the variables as exchangeable is that they must be consistent with each other. As such, I run twenty regressions of the form y i α ij β ij y j ε where y i is a candidate dependent variable from source i, and y j is a candidate dependent variable from source j being used as an independent variable. The tests are F-tests of two assumptions, where the null hypotheses represent variables which could be substituted without introducing bias or noise.
H 0 : α ij 0
The results of these tests are displayed as p statistics in Table 4 . Columns in Table 4 refer to the dependent variable (i.e. i) and rows to the independent variable (i.e. j). Of the forty comparisons shown, Table 4 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected in thirty-three cases at the 1 per cent level: the different sources do not measure the same thing in the same way.
4
This is due to 7!=5040 capturing all possible permutations. Note: These regressions do not limit the sample to that of Benedek et al. (2012) , and so may state a larger number of sources per observation with regard to their sample.
The differences between sources have been shown in Section 2 to make a difference when there is only one source per observation. Table 4 reports tests regarding whether the various sources measure the same variable, and demonstrates very strongly that they do not meet simple tests of their agreement. In only one case do the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis: when the OECD variable is used as the dependent variable and the WEO variable is used as the independent variable. In the regression where those roles are reversed, the null hypothesis is rejected.
Option 2 Different regressions
The second option, if treating the various dependent variables as interchangeable is not sensible, is to treat all variables as completely independent. This avoids needlessly introducing noise into the regressions, though it does potentially introduce problems of sample selection bias that Benedek et al. (2012) avoid. The newly-created dataset means that the maximum number of sources for the maximum number of variables was created. Unlike the results in Table 3 , any individual country can appear multiple times if the relevant data exists. I make three other changes to the preferred specification of Benedek et al. (2012) . First, the specification introduces a one-year lag for aid variables. This is more realistic, as it is difficult to imagine aid having a contemporary effect on tax revenue. It also reduces fears of endogeneity (while not removing them), as tax shortfalls could easily lead to short-term contemporary increases in aid, such as in the case of a natural disaster. Second, I disaggregate trade into imports and exports, as they are likely to have different effects (see Clist and Morrissey 2011) . Specifically, it is to be expected that imports increase tax revenue, as they provide a relatively easy avenue for tax collection. By contrast, exports are usually taxed less than domestic consumption, and so we would expect a negative coefficient given the opportunity cost of high exports includes foregone tax revenue. Third, I move away from estimating nonlinearities in the aid-tax relationship. Given data constraints and quality, it does not seem prudent to attempt to recover precise estimates of turning points. As can be seen from Table 2 estimates of turning points are very unstable, and so the preferred estimation is less ambitious.
13 What can be learnt from the results reported in Table 5 ? It is heartening that despite problems with the dependent variable, coefficients on the variables agriculture, industry, exports and imports tend to agree. The most consistent coefficient estimate is that for agriculture, which is always found to be negative. The last column, relating to the OECD source, has fewer observations and is the least similar to others. As in Clist and Morrissey (2011) , the decision to split trade into imports and exports is justified by the coefficients on the two variables being of opposite signs. The signs are in line with theoretical predictions: imports are relatively easily to tax and exports lead to foregone domestic consumption, which would have been taxed. The log level of per capita income is insignificant in every regression.
Turning to the variables of interest, aid grants and loans are significant in only three of a possible twelve cases. Both are found to be positive and negative in difference specifications. However, it is remarkable that in no specification is the coefficient on aid grants negative and significant. In fact, the only significant effects for aid variables are positive for grants and negative for loans.
Option 3 MIMIC
The third option represents a middle way between treating the different possible dependent variables as interchangeable and treating them separately. A multiple indicators multiple cause (MIMIC) model can be applied in this case. The model was introduced by Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975) , and an example of its use can be found in Giles (1999) . To describe briefly, the model states that there is an unobserved latent variable y* (tax revenue), but multiple indicators y i ,…,y m are observed (the various candidates for the dependent variable).
The MIMIC model then considers two sorts of relationships. For the relationship between the causes and the latent variable, an equation of the following form is estimated:
y* a 1 x 1 ,…,a k x k ε
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The relationship between the latent variable and the indicators is also modelled, using equations of the form:
y m α m β m y* u m
These are then jointly estimated using maximum likelihood. 5 Figure 1 is perhaps useful to visualise the model. The benefit of this approach should be seen predominately as a robustness check on the results presented in Table 5 . The MIMIC model allows multiple candidate dependent variables to be used simultaneously, and can provide a larger sample than those using one candidate at a time.
Figure 1 The MIMIC model
One complication of using MIMIC models when there is not absolute overlap in sources is that it may be that models do not converge. Only one combination of sources works, and so Table 6 reports the coefficients from that regression. A further complication is that it is not feasible to use fixed effects in this case. Table 6 contains the full results for all equations. One estimated coefficient must be constrained in the model, and so  for the latent variable's effect on BA Tax Revenue is constrained to equal 1. The benefit of this approach is evident in the sample size, as the sample is much larger than those presented in Table 5 . Dealing first with the equations of the form (1) on the right panel, we can see that both indicators are positively correlated with the latent variable. The WEO variable measures all government revenue, and so it is no surprise that the constants are such that WEO is five units (where the variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP, logged) higher. The coefficient on the latent variable in the WEO equation is less than one, meaning that revenue is estimated to be less affected by tax revenue than the GFS measure. Moving to the left panel, we see familiar and reassuring parameter estimates in most cases. For the variables of interest, we see that both types of aid are consistent with higher tax receipts in the following year, but the result is only significant (at the 1 per cent level) for aid grants. The control variables are almost all as expected and all significant: higher tax receipts are associated with less agriculture, more industry, being richer and importing more. The only variable which is not in line with expectations is that related to exports, where a positive effect is found.
Option 4: New dataset
A fourth option in attempting to replicate the results of Benedek et al. (2012) has recently become available due to the newly created International Centre for Tax and Development Government Revenue Dataset (ICTD GRD). This new dataset is the culmination of a threeyear effort to provide a consistent and accurate estimate of tax revenue in developing countries. Crucially, there was an emphasis on compatible sources in the construction of this dataset to allow comparisons across countries and time periods. Table 7 provides the results of applying my preferred specification (used in Table 5 ) to the new data. This exercise provides several benefits. First, it provides a further test of previous research in this area, by using what appears to be the most accurate dataset available. In maintaining a comparable specification with minimal adjustments, the new data can be used to evaluate previous findings in this area. Second, as the new dataset is used to tackle new issues, it is useful to benchmark it using a familiar econometric specification on older datasets. Table 7 has the now familiar pattern for the majority of coefficients: tax revenue is positively associated with having higher imports, a smaller agriculture sector, lower exports and a smaller industrial sector. Of the six coefficients on the aid variables, only the coefficient for aid grants in column (1) is significant, with a negative sign. When a lag of one or two years is used, however, the coefficient for aid grants is both smaller and insignificant. This specification and data provide the only negative and significant effect of aid grants on domestic tax revenue I have found. However, a negative contemporary association is not necessarily evidence that aid grants cause lower domestic tax revenue. In any given year, a contemporary association is more likely to be the result of aid donors compensating recipients in adverse conditions (e.g. an economic downturn). If aid does corrode tax revenue, it is more likely to do so over a period of time, and yet the effect becomes insignificant over this time period.
Discussion and conclusion
Replication has long been recognised as performing a vital role in assessing the credibility of empirical results (see Camfield and Palmer-Jones (2013) for a recent review of the issues). For this reason I have attempted to replicate the results presented by Benedek et al. (2012) , as it is the most high profile recent empirical research paper that reports differential effects from aid grants and loans on tax revenue. Like Carter (2013) , I have failed to replicate the specific results. In only one case have I found a reported negative effect for aid grants: when contemporary aid grants are used. The specific replication failed even when using the exact dataset for the dependent variable reportedly used by Benedek et al. (2012) . While Carter (2013) also provides an extensive critique of the methods used by Benedek et al. (2012) to combat endogeneity (mainly the use of GMM), I argue that there appear to be much more fundamental issues with the original data used. Specifically, several datasets are apparently used to construct a single dependent variable despite different data definitions. Tests show that previous specifications are not robust to the use of source dummies or running separate Given the data quality, it is heartening that the various empirical approaches employed here to deal with the issue of multiple candidate dependent variables point in a single direction: there is very little evidence that aid grants undermine domestic tax revenue. The only significant and negative coefficient relating to aid in Table 5 and Table 6 actually relates to aid loans. The only significant and negative coefficient for aid grants relates to contemporaneous aid, and is thus dogged by endogeneity concerns. The weight of the empirical evidence suggests that aid has a relatively small, possibly positive, influence on domestic tax revenue. There is not sufficient evidence to suggest that the composition of aid should be influenced by concerns relating to differential effects on tax revenue. Wider concerns relating to a longer-term corrosive effect on government cannot be dismissed on the basis of these results (even if aid leads to higher tax revenue, it may be that tax is a lower proportion of total government revenue than it would be without aid), but neither can it be used to support them.
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Appendices Appendix 1 System break Table A1 provides evidence that, as suspected, there is no system break in the data provided by Benedek et al. (2012) . 
